ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
his study examines the relationship between corporate voluntary disclosure and firm performance. According to signaling theory (Spence, 1973) , the main objective of firm disclosure is to inform analysts and investors of about the firm quality and value. In this regard, Verrecchia (1983) suggests that corporate disclosure helps analysts and investors to predict future earnings, as corporate managers have to disclose value-relevant information.
Numerous studies demonstrate that the informativeness of voluntary disclosure reduces the cost of capital (Francis et al., 2008; Karamanou and Nishiotis, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2011) and increases the firm value (Lajili and Zeghal, 2006; Banghøj and Plenborg, 2008; Cheung et al., 2010; Hassan and Mohd-Saleh, 2010; Al-Akraa and Jahangir-Ali, 2012) . Some other studies especially focus on corporate voluntary disclosure in annual reports. These reports are the main documents published by firms and are generally used by stakeholders to assess firm performance (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Banghøj and Plenborg, 2008; Hassan et al., 2009; Uyar and Kiliç, 2012) . Hence, previous research on voluntary disclosure demonstrates that relevant corporate information reveals firm value. The present paper extends this previous research and investigates whether the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports signalizes firm performance.
For the empirical analyses, we use panel data of 1074 firms-years listed on the Euronext Paris stock exchange. Firstly, we deploy a non-parametric approach to assess firm performance. In particular, we rely on data envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure the firm ability to maximize its value (output) given a set of determinants (inputs). Secondly, we employ a parametric approach to explain firm performance proxies. We consider the estimated efficiency scores obtained from the DEA approach as a dependent variable. In parallel, we use disclosure indexes, which measure the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports, as independent variables.
The empirical findings show a positive relationship between disclosure indexes and performance measures. They provide evidence that the level of voluntary information disclosed in annual reports plays a significant signaling role of firm performance. However, the extent of this role depends on the nature of the voluntary disclosure, i.e. strategic, financial or corporate governance information. The findings presented and discussed in this article should provide useful insights for academics as well as practitioners. As far as we know, this study is one of the first, especially in the French context, to consider the multidimensionality of firm performance when investigating whether the extent of voluntary disclosure signalizes corporate performance. Thus, the methodological Several studies evidence the relevance of corporate voluntary disclosure by its effect on the cost of capital. They point out that firms which have increased the level of voluntary disclosure show a lower cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Piotroski, 1999; Verrecchia, 2001; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) . In this regard, Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) , Espinosa and Trombetta (2007) and Francis et al. (2008) find a negative association between voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital. Some other studies examine the relevance of corporate voluntary disclosure through its effect on the firm value (Lajili and Zeghal, 2006; Cheung et al., 2010; Hassan and MohdSaleh, 2010; d'Al-Akraa and Jahangir-Ali, 2012) . They evidence the existence of a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure and the firm value. Hence, they highlight the significant signaling role of corporate voluntary disclosure. For instance, Hassan et al. (2009) specify that corporate voluntary disclosure mitigates uncertainty surrounding firm growth perspectives and facilitates share trading. Consequently voluntary disclosure is likely to affect the firm value. Based on the arguments of the signaling theory and the empirical results of prior studies, we anticipate that corporate voluntary disclosure may be considered as a signaling tool revealing firm performance.
An important element of debate in finance research is how to assess firm performance. Performance evaluation through the income statement is the most common approach. Several criticisms have been addressed to the use of accounting measures of performance (Benston, 1985) . Market evaluation through for instance market-tobook ratio or Tobin's Q could be presented as alternative estimates of firm performance. However, market values depend on investor confidence and on other factors outside the direct control of firms (Nanka-Bruce, 2009). Thus, market values as measures of performance are not entirely attributable to firm specific characteristics (Nanka-Bruce, 2009).
In this study, we deploy another alternative multidimensional measure of performance to counteract such difficulties. This measure of performance is based on technical efficiency through both parametric and nonparametric approaches. Note that Technical efficiency relates to the success of firms to produce maximum outputs from a set of inputs under a given production technology (Nanka-Bruce, 2009). Some previous papers have linked technical efficiency to a number of corporate governance aspects, such as board of directors and ownership structure. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no study has associated this alternative measure of performance with corporate disclosure policy. To summarize, this study aims explicitly to investigate the link between the level of corporate voluntary disclosure indexes and firm multidimensional performance proxies.
METHODOLOGY Estimating Firm Performance Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
In this paper, we measure multidimensional firm performance using a non-parametric approach of data envelopment analysis (DEA). In this approach, each firm represents a unique decision making unit (DMU). Based on rigorous linear mathematical programming, the method focuses on the observed data of each DMU. This method makes it possible to draw conclusions based on efficiency comparisons with peers, and gives indications regarding needed policy changes (Charnes et al., 1994) . In other words, it distinguishes inefficient DMUs from efficient ones based on whether or not they lie on the efficient frontier of the possibility set. This set is composed of all feasible input-output combinations with a production technology that transforms a vector of N inputs
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This possibility set T can be formulated as follows:
We analyze the relative performance using an output-oriented projection model, producing the largest possible outputs from a given set of inputs. Efficient firms are those that succeed in using minimum inputs to produce maximum outputs. Concretely, we measure firm performance via its value-creation capacity and, in particular, we examine corporate managers' ability to maximize firm value with an optimal allocation of the same inputs. In other words, we examine whether operating and investment decisions are optimal with regard to obtaining a higher firm value. We use firm value proxies as outputs and operating and investment policy proxies as inputs.
Inputs And Outputs Selection
The principal difficulty with the DEA approach is the choice and specification of inputs and outputs. We base our selection of inputs and outputs on prior research. We select determinants of firm value that are widely used in corporate finance. Figure 1 illustrates the modeling of firm performance. Table 1 presents the selected inputs and outputs of our DEA analysis, the variable measurements and the main corresponding references, respectively. 
Firm profitability
Return on equity (ROE) = Net benefit / Ownership equity Demsetz and Lehn (1985) ; Holderness and Sheehan (1988) ; Denis and Denis (1994); Thomsen and Pedersen (1996) and Li and Simerly (1998 
Empirical Specification
To test the relationship between corporate voluntary disclosure and firm performance, we deploy the logit model presented below. The dependent variable (PEFF) takes the value of 1 if a firm is located on the efficiency frontier and 0 otherwise. The voluntary disclosure level is used as an independent variable. Firm size, analyst following, dividend policy and industry are deployed as control variables.
PEFF it = α 0 + α 1 VD it + α 2 SIZ it + α 3 ANF it + α 4 DPS it + α 5 IND it + µ it Where for firm i in year t: VD is equal to the global disclosure index. SIZ is the logarithm of total assets. ANF is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of financial analysts. DPS is the dividend per share. IND is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company operates in a high-technology sector and 0 otherwise. μ is the error term.
The independent variable (VD) is the voluntary disclosure score derived from annual reports. We focus on the annual report for several reasons. Firstly, the annual report is considered as the main source of mandatory as well as voluntary disclosures, providing important information for analysts and investors (Wiseman, 1982; Rockness, 1985; Neu et al., 1998) . Secondly, the level of firm disclosure is best evidenced by the amount of information contained in an annual report (Zarb, 2007) . For instance, Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Holland (1998) find a high positive correlation between corporate disclosure in annual reports and other forms of disclosures. The independent variable (VD) is measured using self-constructed disclosure indexes. We develop a disclosure checklist inspired from Meek et al. (1995) , Botosan (1997) , Chau and Gray (2002) , Eng and Mak (2003) , Lim et al. (2007) and Francis et al. (2008) . This checklist consists of 112 items (see Appendix) falling into four general categories, namely, strategic information (STGVD, 30 items), non-financial information (NFNVD, 35 items), financial information (FNVD, 36 items), and corporate governance information (GOVVD, 11 items). Following Cooke (1992), we conduct a content analysis to identify the needed information in annual reports. ARVD is the sum of the scores attributed to each item in the voluntary disclosure checklist. The Clute Institute
The Appendix presents the checklist of 112 items included in the disclosure scores. To avoid subjectivity, we consider all the disclosed items as equally important, despite the possible variability of information content from one item to another. Thus, we assign a value of 1 when a given item is disclosed and 0 otherwise. The total score is computed as the unweighted score sum of all index items.
The agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that firm size affects firm performance because of its impact on ownership structure and the resulting agency problems/conflicts of interest. Indeed, large firms generally realize scale economies which, in turn, influence firm performance (Nanka-Bruce, 2009).
Financial analysts are likely to play a significant role in reducing information asymmetry between corporate managers and investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001) . Analysts select firms that are likely to have the most profitable and least risky securities (Boubaker and Labegorre, 2006) . As a result, analyst following may reflect firm performance and/or quality to stock market participants. Empirical studies (Pearson, 1992; Chung, 2000; Lang et al., 2004) confirm the signaling role of analyst following. They demonstrate a positive relationship between analyst following and firm value.
According to the signaling theory, the dividend distribution is considered a signal of firm performance. Indeed, in an uncertain economic environment where external investors do not have perfect information about firm profitability, dividends are likely to inform about firm expected cash flows (Bhattacharya, 1979 (Bhattacharya, , 1980 Kalay, 1980; Miller and Rock, 1985) .
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Sample Selection And Descriptive Statistics
Our initial sample consists of all SBF 250 French firms listed the on Euronext stock market from 2004 to 2009. We exclude financial and assimilated firms (SIC codes 4900-4999 and 6000-6999) because they operate in an environment where disclosure is more likely to be a result of specific legal and regulatory requirements. Furthermore, we discard all firms with missing financial or governance data. Finally, we obtain a sample 1074 firms-years (179 firms). Financial figures are obtained from Worldscope database. Corporate annual reports are downloaded from the French stock market authority (AMF) website. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and the independent variables. The descriptive statistics show that, on average, 26.72% of our sample is located on the efficiency frontier with a standard deviation of 44.27%. We can notice a divergence in the efficiency of these firms. We can also detect diversity in the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure in annual reports. The ARVD ranges from a low value of 0.0708 to a high value of 0.7122. The mean score is 0.43, with a standard deviation of 12.50%. The Clute Institute Table 3 presents the results of the regression model testing for the relationship between disclosure index and firm performance and controlling for firm size, analyst following, dividend policy and industry.
Regression Results
The findings show a positive and statistically significant relationship between the PEFF and VD (measured here by ARVD) variables. They validate our hypothesis predicting the existence of an association between the level of corporate voluntary disclosures and firm performance proxies. Hence, voluntary disclosure in annual reports plays an important signaling role. It provides relevant information explaining firm performance and quality. These findings are consistent with previous studies (e.g. Uyar and Kiliç, 2012) which have demonstrated the significance of voluntary information in revealing firm quality and value. Further analyses show that the relevance of voluntary disclosure is not homogenous for all information categories. The PEFF variable is negatively and significantly explained by STGVD and GOVVD variables. The NFNVD variable is positively and significantly related to firm performance proxies. These findings raise the question of the extent to which each voluntary information category in annual reports reveals firm performance. Hence, corporate voluntary disclosure decisions appear to be driven by incentives and constraints. Firms may find it advantageous to disclose additional pieces of information (i.e., non-financial voluntary information). In contrast, they may find it disadvantageous to disclose relevant strategic information when they operate especially in a high competitive market. This may explain the divergence in the relevance of voluntary information categories.
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CONCLUSION
This paper empirically investigated the relationship between corporate voluntary disclosure and firm performance. Based on the signaling theory, we considered corporate voluntary disclosure as a signaling instrument reporting firm performance to investors and financial analysts.
The empirical analyses were based on panel data of 1074 firms-year listed on the Euronext Paris stock market. Performance evaluation has been a critical area of research. We discussed the limits of accounting and financial performance measures and attempted to take into account the multidimensionality of firm performance. Thus, we used a non-parametric approach to measure firm performance via the technical efficiency. Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), we measured a firm ability to maximize its value (outputs) given a set of determinants (inputs). The estimated efficiency scores were used as a dependent variable. We used disclosure indexes which measure the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports as independent variable.
The empirical findings reveal a positive relationship between disclosure indexes and performance measures. They provide evidence that the level of voluntary information disclosed in annual reports plays a significant signaling role of firm performance. However, the extent of this role depends on the nature of the voluntary disclosure, i.e. whether it involves strategic, financial or corporate governance information. 
